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Xarlt Squillace, VDi Yer•i t7 of 1ryoaizag COllege of Law 
I. Bature of the Pro~lea 
Pollution of ambient air is •ost often a aulti-source problem. 
Because some of these sources may be located in different 
jurisdictions subject to different legal •tandards or constraints, 
protection of ambient air quality in these circumstances poses 
unique legal problems. From a legal perspective, the •ost 
difficult problems are those involving transnational air pollution 
since regulators must take account of the different legal systems 
as well as the different standards. By contrast, interstate 
problems are, by their nature, more easily susceptible to federal 
solution. The authors of the Clean Air Act have attempted to 
address both international and interstate air pollution problems. 
In each case, they have met with little success. 
II. Regulation of International Air Pollution 
A. Clean Air Act, § 115: Authorizes the EPA to require states 
responsible for air pollution that may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign 
country, to revise tbeir state implementation plans to prevent 
such air pollution. 
Preconditions that must be met before EPA can act: 
1. EPA must have reports, surveys or studies from any duly 
constituted international agency that support the alleged 
pollution, OR a request from the Secretary of State to 
take action alleging that such pollution exists; AND 
2. EPA must determine that the foreign country affords the 
United states ••essentially the same rights" with respect 
to the prevention of air pollution problems that emanate 
from that country. 
B. The only case to date arising under § 115 concerns the 
impact of sulfur emissions from facilities in the midwestern 
united States on the acid rain problem of Canada. A brief 
chronology of events in that case may be helpful to 
understanding the how § 115 works. This chronology is set 
forth below. 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS: CANADIAN/AMERICAN ACID RAIN DISPUTE 
10/80: International Joint Commission (IJC) issues the Seventh 
Annual Report on Great Lakes water quality, Stating that acid 
depositions are endangering public welfare in the u.s. and Canada, 
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12/17/80: canada adopts legislation allowing their vovernaent to 
order the abatement of emissions from Canadian sources which 
contribute to transboundary air pollution. Canadian Clean Air Act 
Section 21.1. 
01/13/81: Days before leaving office, EPA Administrator Douglas 
Costle notifies Secretary of State Edmund Muskie by letter of the 
IJC's findings and canada's new legislation pertaining to 
transboundary pollution. Costle finds both preconditions to EPA's 
action under Section 115 have been met. 
06/26/85: State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F.Supp 1472 (D.c. D.C. 
1985) • State of New York and other plaintiffs contend that 
Costle's findings of 1/13/81 required EPA to invoke Section 115 of 
the Clean Air Act. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson finds: 
(1) that Costle 1 s January 13, 1981 letter to Muskie satisfied both 
requirements of Section 115 of the Clean Air Act (613 F.Supp at 
1482); and (2) that the EPA Administrator has a mandatory duty to 
act under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act once those requirements 
are met. Id . at 1477. The District Court ordered Administrator 
Thomas to give formal notification to the Governors of states where 
harmful emissions originate, in accordance with Section 115. 
10/22/85: Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator, issues a memoradum on 
whether Canada's Clean Air Act meets the reciprocity provision of 
Section 115. Thomas finds that the Canadian law satisfies the 
reciprocity requirements of Section 115 insofar as it offers a 
comparable procedure to the one established in Section 115. 
Nonetheless, Costle finds that Section 115 further requires a 
finding that canada will, in fact, implement a comparable control 
program if and when the United States is prepared to implement a 
program to protect canadian air quality. 
09/18/86: Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
cert . denied, 107 s.ct 3196 (1987). The D.C. Court of Appeals 
rules that the decision to invoke Section 115 was a rule which 
required adherence to APA rulemaking procedures before 
implementation. The opinion was written by Judge (now Justice) 
Scalia and ends with this statement which may portend future 
problems for the plaintiff in this controversy: "How and when the 
Agency (EPA) chooses to proceed to the stage of notification 
triggered by the findings (supporting invocation of Section 115) 
is within the agency's discretion and not subject to judicial 
compulsion." 802 F~2d at 1448 . 
04/07/86: Province of Ontario , State of New York petitions EPA to 
publish notice and comment findings by former EPA Administrator 
Costle in 1981. New York also requests EPA to publish a notice 





10/14/86: Donald Clay, EPA acting assistant administrator, 
notifies state of New York that complex questions pertaining to 
acid rain and deposition must be answered before any action can be 
taken on New York's April 7, 1986 petition. Clay also infonaed New 
York that Castle's 1981 statements did not constitute findings 
triggering action under Section 115. 
11/01/88: The Ontario government petitions u.s. court of Appeals, 
D.C. Circuit to order the EPA to begin rule making procedures under 
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act. Ontario is demanding action 
based on EPA's refusal to publish Castle's 1981 findings (due to 
EPA's belief that insufficient evidence exists to support a 
regulatory program). Ontario contends scientific proof exists that 
acid rain precursors from smokestacks of the Ohio Valley and 
adjacent u.s. states are deposited on Ontario's lakes, forests, and 
cities . 
III. Regulation of Interstate Pollution 
A. Clean Air Act, § 110(a) (2) (E): Requires each states• state 
implementation plan (SIP) to contain adequate provisions --
(i) prohibiting any stationary source within the State from 
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will 
(I) prevent attainment or maintenance by any other state 
of any • • • primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard or 
(II) interfere with measures required to be included in 
the applicable implementation plan for any other state 
under Part c to prevent significant deterio~ation of air 
quality or to protect visibility, and 
(ii) insuring compliance with the requirements of section 126 
relating to int~rstate pollution abatement. 
B. Clean Air Act, 1 126(a): Requires each SIP to provide 60 
days prior written notice to nearby States of major new 
sources of air pollution that are either subject to the PSD 
provisions of the statute, or which may significantly 
contribute to levels of air pollution in excess of the NAAQS 
in any AQCR outside the State. 
Section 126(b): Authorizes any State to petition the EPA for 
a finding that any major source emits or will emit any air 
pollutant in violation of 1 110 (a) (2) (E) (i). The EPA must act 
on any such petition within 60 days. But see, Air Pollution 
Control District v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984), where 
the court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a 22 
aonth delay in acting on a petition was not qrounds for 
granting the petition unless the plaintiff could show tbat 
EPA's failure was arbitrary and capricious. 
3 
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Section 126(c): Provides that it is a violation of a SIP for 
a major new source to be constructed or operated in violation 
of I 110(a)(2)(E)(i), notwithstanding that the facility vas 
granted a permit by the State. Further, it is a violation of 
the SIP for any existing source to continue operations more 
than three month after a violation of 1 110(a)(2(E)(i) baa 
been found. Extensions beyond this three month period may be 
granted under certain conditions so long as they do not exceed 
three years. 
c. Case Law 
Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982): New York's 
Long Island Lighting Company's (LILCO) facilities were using 
2.8% sulfur fuel under a temporary SIP provision approved by 
EPA. During this time, Connecticut facilities had been 
required by their State SIP to use o.st sulfur fuel. 
Subsequently, New York petitioned EPA to allow an indefinite 
extension of the 2. 8% sulfur provision. While New York's 
request for a permanent extension of its 2.8% sulfur standard 
was pending, Connecticut petitioned EPA to change its • 5% 
requirement to 1%. 1 
connecticut also petitioned EPA under § 126 of the Act, 
alleging that approval of the requested extension by New York 
would violate § 110(a)(2)(E)(i). New York's sulfur fuel 
content affected ambient air levels of both S02 and total 
suspended particulates (TSP). Connecticut was an attainment 
area for S02 but a nonattainment area for TSP. Connecticut 
alleged violations of § 110 (a) (2) (E) with respect to both 
pollutants. The Court's decision addressed each pollutant 
separately. 
Sulfur Dioxide: Among other things, the Court found that the 
New York proposal could be approved "only if it would not 
cause a violation of primary or secondary standards for sulfur 
dioxide in connecticut, given Connecticut's then prevailing 
emission limitations on its own sources of pollution. •• 
(Emphasis added.) Two important conclusions follow. First, 
EPA was not, as a matter of law, required to consider the 
impact of Connecticut's proposed revision (from 0.5% sulfur 
to 1%) before approving the New York proposal. Second, no 
violation of § 110(a) (2)(E) (i) (I) exists merely because 
pollution from one state has a "substantial impact" on the 
1 A separate and unsuccessful challenge to EPA's approval of 
connecticut • s change was filed by the Connecticut Fund for tbe 
Environment (CFE). connecticut Fund for the Environment v. EPA, 
696 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1982). CFE vas a co-plaintiff with the State 





ambient air quality of another •tate. 
conclusions is discussed below. 
. ~ -·L" .. ... . - ·- · · · 
Bach of these 
The first conclusion was not thoroughly analyzed by the 
court because EPA had subsequently approved Connecticut • • 
proposal and in the course of that decision bad concluded that 
the combined effect of the New York and Connecticut decisions 
would not cause a violation of Connecticut's 801 standards. 
Had it been more thoroughly analyzed, this conclusion would 
not have withstood scrutiny. In Ashbacker Radio com. y. Fcc, 
326 u.s. 327 (1945) the United States Supreme Court held that 
mutually exclusive permit applications for radio broadcasting 
licenses which are pending at the same time must be considered 
together in order to satisfy due process requirements. 
Likewise, two SIP revisions which are mutually exclusive (in 
the sense that both could not be approved without causing a 
violation of the NAAQS) ought to be considered concurrently 
in order to insure that the agency •akes a concrete choice 
from between alternative proposals. Thus, where State X is 
facing SIP revisions from State Y which •ay adversely affect 
the ambient air in State X, state X might reasonably propose 
a revision that would allow its own sources to utilize the 
available increments of clean air and demand that EPA consider 
the proposals of State X and Y concurrently. To the extent 
that current law encourages this negative form of competition 
for pollution rights, it should be changed. 
The second conclusion which obtains from the court's 
findings is that a state cannot establish a violation of § 
1lO(a)(2)(E}(i)(I), merely by showing that pollution from 
another state has a substantial impact on ambient air in the 
receiving state. The court reaches this conclusion from a 
direct application of the language of § 110 (a) (2) (E) (i) (I) 
which, by it terms, applies only where a source from one state 
will "prevent the attainment or maintenance of any ••• national 
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard in any other 
state. " IsL. since Connecticut was an attainment area for 
S02 , no possible violation of the cited provision could be 
shown. Interestingly, EPA argued and the court found, that 
substantial impacts from interstate air pollution could be 
addressed under § llO(a) (2) (E) (i) (II). That provision 
prohibits sources in one state from interfering with "measures 
required to be included in the applicable implementation plan 
tor any other State under part c to prevent the significant 
deterioration of air quality or to protect visibility." 
Unfortunately, this provision is wholly useless where as in 
the Connecticut case, a state seeks to maintain an existing 
practice. This is because the PSD provisions are designed not 
to improve air quality, but rather to limit additional 
contributions of air pollution into the area. 
'l'otal 8uapen4e4 Particulates: As noted previously, Connecticut 
5 
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was a nonattainment area for particulates. Unfortunately, the 
equities which might have worked in Connecticut•• favor with 
respect to 502 had Connecticut been a nonattainment area for 
S02 , did not exist vi th particulates. Unlike the 802 
standards for the two states, New York's TSP standards were 
more stringent than those of connecticut. Moreover, the LILCO 
plants were all equipped with electrostatic precipitators. 
Althou9h, New York did contribute a small amount of 
particulate matter to Connecticut's air, the contributions 
were found to be de minimis. Accordingly, the Court held that 
they did not "prevent the attainment or maintenance" of the 
NAAQS within the meaning of the law. 2 
Air Pollution Control District y, EPA 702 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 
1984) : The Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County, 
Kentucky (Louisville area) filed a petition under § 126 
alleging violations of § 110(a) (2) (E) (i) by the Gallagher 
Power Station in Floyd County in southern Indiana. Jefferson 
county was a nonattainment area for S02 • The Xentucky SIP 
imposed an S02 standard of 1. 2 lbsfMBTU on its sources in 
Jefferson County. Indiana oriqinally proposed to require that 
the Gallagher station meet the same standard but later 
obtained EPA approval for a standard of 6 lbs/MBTU -- 5 times 
the amount allowed from sources in neighborinq Jefferson 
County. The effect was to allow Gallagher to operate without 
any S02 pollution controls. Louisville Gas and Electric, the 
primary producer of S02 in Jefferson county, had spent $138 
million dollars to comply with the Kentucky SIP requirement 
for 502 reductions. 
EPA conducted a study which showed that the Gallagher 
Plant contributed only 3\ of the S02 concentration in those 
particular areas in Jefferson County where the NAAQS were 
actually being violated. In other parts of the County, 
however, Gallagher contributed as much as 34.5\ of the primary 
NAAQS and 47' of the secondary NAAQS. Nonetheless, after 22 
months, EPA denied the petition on the grounds that "the 
Gallagher plant does not cause or substantially contribute to 
a violation of the S02 NAAQS. 11 
Jefferson County made two principal arquments. 3 Fir~t, 
2 In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically 
deferred ruling on EPA's claim that§ llO(a) (2) (E)(i)(I) prohibits 
only those SIP revisions which "significantly contribute11 to the 
ambient air quality in the affected state. 
s The County also argued that I 301(a)(2)(A), which requires 
EPA "to assure fairness and uniformity in the criteria, procedures 
and policies •••• ", required the court to balance interstate 
equities. The court found, however, that this provision related 
6 
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they claimed that the interstate pollution provisions of the 
statute should be construed to allow a state to reserve for 
itself a aarqiD of vrowtb. EPA had originally taken the 
position (Carter Administration) that one state could not 
interfere with another state's aarqin of growth. Pollowinq 
the chanqe in administrations, EPA backed off from this 
position . The court defers to the agency on this. As a 
strict legal matter, the court found that the language of the 
Act prohibiting sources in one state from preventing the 
attainment or maintenance of the HAAQS in any other State did 
not protect a state's aarqin for growth. Arquably, however, 
an area projected to grow, needs some margin if it is going 
to maintain its ambient air quality. Given the inequity that 
existed between Gallagher and the sources of SOi in Jefferson 
County, the court might have used this argument to impose some 
controls on Gallagher. Jefferson county also argued that 
Gallagher was preventing the attainment of the NAAQS for S02 
because it was contributing S01 to an S01 nonattainment area . 
EPA argued that this did not establish a violation of § 
llO (a) (2) (E) (i) (I) because it did not substantially contribute 
to the S02 problem in Jefferson County. To support this 
claim, EPA pointed to a study which showed that Gallagher 
contributed only 3% of the S02 in those areas of Jefferson 
County where the NAAQS were actually being violated. In other 
parts of the county, the Gallagher's contribution consumed as 
much as 34% of the primary S02 standard and 47% of secondary 
standard. The court accepted EPA's substantial contribution 
argument , relying on similar language used at § 126(a) of the 
Act. That provision requires states to provide notice to 
other states of those sources that would 11significantly 
contribute" to air pollution in excess of the NAAQS. The 
court reasoned that this provision suggested congressional 
concern only with such sources. 
D. Restorinq Interstate Equities. Whatever the legal merits 
of the Connecticut and Air Pollution Control District 
decisions, they plainly do not achieve the conqressional 
policy underlying the interstate air pollution provisions of 
the law. on the contrary 1 these decisions 1 actually encourage 
states to allow polluting industries along their borders to 
consume as much of the pollution increments as are available 
in both the home state and the neighborinq state. The first 
state to consume these increments will apparently be 
protected, irrespective of the relative efforts of the two 
states to control their sources of pollution, so long as the 
polluting state can show that it has not substantially 
contributed to violations of the HAAQS. The result in the lli 
Pollution Control District case is particularly troublesoae 




because it makes a mockery of Kentucky•• efforts to control 
the pollution problem in that state. 
What can be done? •PA JlegulatioDs: The easiest and most 
logical place to resolve this problem is from within the EPA 
itself. The Supreme Court has shown a ~eat willingness to 
defer to EPA 1s interpretation of its laws•, and the language 
of I 110 (a) (2) (E) is sufficiently ambiguous to afford the 
agency ample discretion to implement the law in a manner that 
will encourage pollution control. Two specific suggestions 
are offered here. 
1. Section llO(a)(2)(E)(i)(I) prohibits foreign states 
from preventing the "attainBent or maintenancen of the 
ambient air quality standards. EPA and the courts have 
shown little interest in giving meaning to the word 
11maintenance 11 • Although, that word might be construed 
to address attainment or PSO areas, such areas are more 
specifically, and more stringently addressed at § 
llO(a) (2) (E) (i) (II) which prohibits states from 
interfering with another state's PSD program. 5 Arguably, 
See e.g., Chevron, 
Council, 467 u.s. 837 (1984) 
USA v. Natural Resources Defense 
5 ~, Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982): 
11 [EPA] correctly points out that § [110(a) (2) (E) (i) (II)] 
incorporates the provisions of Part c [the PSD program] into this 
section of the statute, designed to achieve interstate pollution 
abatement . ... Accordingly, the EPA reasonably concluded that § 
[110(a) (2) (E) (i) (I) was not intended to do more than prohibit the 
agency from approving state implementation plan revisions wbich 
will cause violations of the NAAOSs in nearby states... Emphasis 
added. The upshot of this language is that§ 110(a)(2)(E)(i)(I) 
applies to nonattainment areas (or those areas that would be out 
of attainment if a SIP revision is approved), and that § 
110(a)(2)(E) (i)II) applies to PSD areas. Since the PSD program 
requires states to manage ambient air quality so that increases in 
ambient pollution levels do not exceed a specified limit below the 
NAAQS, this seems a reasonable construction which insures 
comprehensive coverage of all areas. There are, however, two 
potential problems with this interpretation. First, the pollution 
increments that are mandated by the PSD program do not apply until 
a major emitting facility has been approved in a PSD area, thus 
establishing a baseline from which the PSD increments can be 
measured. ~Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir. 
1979). Second, despite a conqressional mandate to do so, EPA has 
not promulgated pollution increments for certain criteria 
pollutants. § 166. See also, Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F.2d 165 
(O.Cal. 1987). 'Thus, for these pollutants, the PSD program may 
afford no protection beyond that established by the NAAQS. 
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then tbe word •maintenance• vas intended to address the 
long-term trends in ambient air quality in a specific 
region. Thus, if a region projects a certain amount of 
C)rowtb which will brin; with it associated air pollution, 
a state that contributes significant quantities of air 
pollution to an area that is currently in attainment, aay 
nonetheless prevent the lonq-ran;e •maintenance•• of 
ambient air quality in that region. By defining the word 
"maintenance", as used in 1 110 (a) (2) (E) (i) (I), to 
require protection of the NAAQS against projected 
increases in ambient pollution, EPA could reclaim its 
authority to control significant sources of pollution 
from other states. 
2. Even assuming, as the 6th Circuit does, that 
substantial contribution is the test for determining 
violations of§ llO(a)(2) (E) (i)(I), EPA could and should 
insist that the phrase be defined to take account of 
interstate equities . Thus, in the Air Pollution Control 
District case, the Gallagher plant • s contributions to 
Jefferson County should have been treated as substantial, 
even though only Jt in those areas of violation, because 
Gallagher had no controls on its stacks, while Kentucky·' s 
facilities had substantial controls. It 1s grossly 
unfair to insist, as the court's decision does, that the 
Kentucky facilities, which have already expended $138 
million on air pollution equipment, bear an additional 




The international and interstate air pollution provisions of 
the Clean Air Act were a reasonable atte~t to achieve progress in 
confronting transboundary air pollution problems. Unfortunately, 
EPA has shown no leadership in implementing these provision•. 
While courts might have been expected to demand •tronger 
initiatives .by EPA, the current deferential aood in the courts .. de 
such relief unlikely. If EPA continues to hinder progress on 
transboundary pollution abatement, Congress should respond with 
more specific language. In the case of international air 
pollution, Congress should disapprove of the reciprocity 
determination by Administrator Thomas which requires a showing that 
a foreign country has taken substantive action under its provision 
that parallels § 115 of the Clean Air Act. This should not be 
necessary unless the United states can reasonably claim that the 
conditions for invoking the parallel provision of foreign law have 
been met. Regarding interstate pollution, Congress should insist 
that EPA encourage states which hope to clean their air beyond the 
NAAQS, by allowing those states to protect the •argin for growth 
that they have created from unreasonable intrusions by foreign 
states. In addition, Congress ahould demand that EPA treat states 
equitably. Where one state contributes to a nonattainment problem 
in another state, EPA should compare the efforts that eacb state 
has made to control the air pollution before assessing the 
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